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Why do sanctions need time 
to work? 
Adjustment, learning and anticipation 
Peter A G van Bergeijk and Charles van Marrewijk 
Economists disagree on the influence of time on the probability of success of  economic 
sanctions. Some aryue that it takes time to convince the sanction target. Others 
stress that economic adjustment will reduce incentives to comply. We seek to reconcile 
these different literatures, modelling the taryet's decision to comply as a function of 
both (anticipator)') economic adjustment and Bayesian learning. We show that 
sanctions which do not work instantaneously (ie there is neither political compliance 
nor economic adjustment) can work in the long run, but only if the learning effect 
dominates the adjustment effect. A sufficient condition .for ultimate compliance is 
that (potential) sanction damage that cannot be avoided by adjustment in the lon9 
run exceeds the yield of misconduct. 
Keywords: Sanctions; Adjustment; Learning 
Economic disincentives are increasingly being used in 
all kinds of policy fields. Fines, denial of economic 
benefits, exclusion and the like become more and more 
important in, for example, employment schemes, 
environmental policy and law enforcement. Such 
economic disincentives aim to change the behaviour 
of the target, ie the economic subject on which the 
economic sanction is to be imposed. Practical experi- 
ence with such economic sanctions hows that it can 
take quite some time before the target complies - even 
if the target is repeatedly punished. This is so because 
the target rightly considers actual punishment as an 
uncertain outcome: detection of misdemeanour often is 
less than 100% (and likewise for conviction). Obviously, 
the subjective probability that punishment will actually 
follow upon misconduct increases if the target in the 
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course of time is repeatedly punished. An important 
countervailing force, however, is that the target at the 
same time seeks to reduce the costs or welfare loss of 
punishment. 
This paper investigates the case of economic 
sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. This is 
an interesting subject because policy oriented litera- 
ture and economic trade theory seem contradictory 
on the question of whether the passage of time 
increases or decreases the probability of compliance. 
On the one hand, traditional neoclassical theory 
stresses that reallocation of production factors (both 
during and in anticipation of sanction episodes) will 
reduce the welfare loss of a sanction for a given time 
interval. On the other hand, the target may need some 
time to learn that the sanction threat is real. This 
paper analyses this trade off between learning and 
adjustment for the case of international political 
sanctions that aim at changing the political behaviour 
of other countries, but our findings have a wider 
application to other economic disincentives. 
The relevance of our approach is shown by the 
curiosity that a majority of those foreign policy 
sanctions that have been successfully implemented in
the past, have taken longer than one year to succeed. 
If the intentions of the imposing countries and the 
perceptions of the target country are known with 
certainty, the sanctions should either work directly 
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Figure 1. Successful sanctions by duration (years). 
Source." Hufbauer et al [26]. 
or never at all. The history of the economic sanc- 
tion instrument illustrates both sanctions that work 
directly and sanctions that never seem to work. 
Sanctions that worked more or less instantly are the 
League of Nations' sanctions against Yugoslavia in 
1921 and against Greece in 1925 and the US sanctions 
against he Netherlands in 1948, against South Korea 
in 1975 and against E1 Salvador in 1987. Notable 
protracted failures are the 1954 Spanish sanction 
episode targeted against he British rule of Gibraltar 
(which lasted more than 30 years) and the 1960 US 
sanctions against Cuba which are still in force. These 
border cases can be explained with reference to 
traditional economic theory. However, according to 
the Hufbauer et al [26] database, many successful 
sanctions appear to take some time to work. Indeed, 
more than half the successful sanctions requires two 
years or more to achieve compliance (see Figure 1). 
In order to explain the pattern evident in Figure 1 a 
new theory is needed. 
Another peculiarity of economic sanctions is that 
the implementation of a sanction today does not 
necessarily imply that this sanction will be imple- 
mented in the next period as well. Indeed, according 
to the Hufbauer et al [26] database, about one out of 
three ineffective conomic sanctions lasted one year 
or less (Figure 2). As the target of the sanction did not 
change its behaviour, the reason for implementing the 
sanction in the first place continued in these cases. 
5% 
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9% 
Figure 2. Unsuccessful sanctions by number of years. 9
a Note that 'other' includes all sanctions that were still continuing 
in 1989 (the last year in the Hufbauer et al 1-26] database). 
Evidently then, continuation of a sanction is uncertain. 
This is why any theory of economic sanctions hould 
not start from a deterministic setting. First, it has to 
deal with the stochastic outcome of situations in which 
economic sanctions have been applied. Second, it has 
to acknowledge the impact of(subjective) xpectations 
and probabilities in the decision process. 
The next section clarifies the basic concepts of our 
analysis. The third section introduces adjustment 
when probabilities are exogenous. It would, however, 
be quite inconsistent to allow for adaptations in the 
production structure in reaction to (the possibility of) 
future sanction damage while the expectations about 
the future (ie about the probabilities of sanction 
damage in the next period) are kept constant. So in 
the section following we model expectations formation 
as a process of Bayesian learning. We show that 
sanctions which do not work instantaneously can still 
work in the long run, but only if the learning effect 
dominates the adjustment effect. A sufficient condition 
for ultimate compliance is that the unavoidable part 
of potential sanction damage exceeds the yield of 
misconduct. We then introduce the possibility that the 
target anticipates the imposition of economic sanc- 
tions at some point in the future and develop an 
expression for the optimal length of the process of 
anticipatory adjustment. The final section summarizes 
the main conclusions. 
Settings 
Many authors have argued that the duration of 
economic warefare is essentially positively related to 
the probability of its success. Daoudi and Dajani ([13-], 
pp 168 169), for example, expect that sanctions 
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increasingly hurt when they last longer. Sanctions 
resemble a slow poison: the consequences are revealed 
only in the course of time, weakening the target's 
integrity, and this eventually causes the target's 
collapse. 1 The egonomics textbook treatment of 
foreign policy sanctions, however, suggests a nega- 
tive relationship between success and duration. The 
questions of how much damage can be inflicted on 
the target depends to a large degree on the target's 
(in)flexibility as it reacts to the sanction. Rigidity of 
economic structures being basically a short-term 
phenomenon, it appears probable that the passage of 
time erodes the economic impact of sanctions. 2 
At the start of the 1980s it appeared ifficult to 
reconcile these different views with respect to the 
relationship between time and success. This was 
especially so since empirical evidence at that time, if 
available at all, was inconclusive (Bull [10], p 122). 
Consequently, many authors tressed that the theory of 
economic sanctions was characterized by both a wide 
variety of definitions and the fact that the mechanism 
by which sanctions were supposed to be effective often 
was obscure. 3 Typically, the study of international 
economic penalties was of a (comparative) static 
macroeconomic nature and where dynamics was part 
of the analysis this was only in the sense that the target 
economy was allowed to react by stockpiling or by 
other policies aimed at reducing its vulnerability to 
foreign pressure. 
In the mid- 1980s a new strand of literature recognized 
that not only the implementation of economic sanc- 
tions but also the mere threat to use them can be an 
adequate policy instrument. 4 In the models of, for ex- 
ample, Hughes Hallett and Brandsma [27], Kaempfer 
and Lowenberg [28,29] and Schultz [43] the sender 
countries utter a strategic threat consisting of the 
1Brady ([9], p 299) claims that sanctions with time become 
extremely efficient, because agreement on the international unaccepta- 
bility of the target's conduct causes more and more countries to 
join the embargo. Hanlon and Omond ([23], p 12) argue that even 
tight sanctions will require several years to have an impact. In 
addition, arguing that ineffective sanctions have a tendency to last, 
Dekker ([15], p 396), Lindsay ([34], p 165) and Leyton-Brown ([33], 
p 308) stress economic-psychological factors such as loss of face or 
the fact that the welfare loss should be sudden in order to prevent 
the target population from getting used to the sacrifices. 
2 See for examples Kemp [31], pp 208 217), Frey ([19], pp 103-121) 
and Carbaugh ([11], pp 144-147). 
3 See Van Bergeijk ([2], pp 27-43) for a review of economic and 
non-economic theories of sanctions. 
4 A theory of policy intervention as a defence against possible trade 
disruption by other governments developed following the seminal 
article by Bhagwati and Srinivasan [5]. See, for example, Mayer 
[36], Tolley and Wilman [47], Bergstr6m et al [4], Srinivasan [48], 
Van Marrewijk and Van Bergeijk [3] and Van Bergeijk ([2], 
pp 107-110). This strand of the literature deals both with adjustment 
in reaction to a perceived external threat and with endogenizing 
the probability of trade disruption (as a function of the volume of 
trade). It does not, however, deal with the problems of political 
behaviour and learning that are the topics of the present paper. 
announcement that economic sanction measures will 
be applied. If behaviour is altered the game ends and 
the sender attains its objective in the most efficient 
way, as it does not have to bear the costs of the 
sanction. If, however, a threat is not sufficiently 
credible to change behaviour, punitive action has to 
be carried out. This is painful and costly for both the 
sender and the target since both parties will be unable 
to reap the full benefits of free and undisturbed trade. 
Consequently, a sanction might be too costly to be 
carried out and the threat may appear false. 5 This 
implies that the passage of time may also become a 
positive determinant of success. Actual implemen- 
tation of sanction measures increases the value of the 
threat as even partial implementation i creases the 
probability of (possibly full) application in the next 
period (Van Bergeijk and Van Marrewijk [3]). 
The econometric identification, however, of the 
relationship between compliance and duration is 
problematic as the duration of a sanction should be 
considered endogenous (Lam [31]). 6 Dehejia and 
Wood ([14], p 76) introduce duration in both linear 
and non-linear form in order to allow for a more com- 
plex relationship with the likelihood that a sanction 
succeeds; but the empirical evidence for their preferred 
specification is not impressive. It should, moreover, be 
noted that this variable is particularly inaccurately 
measured. For example, arbitrary rounding in nearly 
10% of the cases results in overstatement of the 
duration of the episode by a factor four or more 
(Bonetti [6]). Hence if a trade off exists between the 
credibility of a threat and the reallocation of factors 
of production then this can only be investigated if both 
expectations and the adjustment process are explicitly 
modelled. 
Moreover, this relationship is complicated by the 
fact that a potential target may anticipate the sanction 
measures and adjusts its economy in advance. Seeler 
[44], for example, points out that in Europe quite 
some time passes between the decision that sanctions 
will be implemented and the moment of their actual 
legal implementation. The UN Security Council 
sanctions provide other examples. 7 Schrijvers [42] 
clarifies that in the diplomatic upswing to the actual 
imposition of UN sanctions a prior determination 
under Article 39 of the UN Charter is necessary in 
5 Actually, this fits in with the economic theory of strategic threats 
and reputation pioneered by Schelling [41] and Boulding [8]. 
6 Lam ([32], p 241), however, in his investigation excludes those 
cases where economic sanctions were only threatened but not 
actually imposed which begs all the interesting questions. 
7The UN Security Council took sanctions against Rhodesia 
(1966-79), South Africa (1977-94), Iraq (1990-), Former Yugoslavia 
(1991), Somalia (1992-), Libya (1992), Liberia (1992-), Haiti 
(1993-) and Angola (1993). 
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Figure 3. The impact of an economic sanction: production, 
consumption and utility. 
order to determine the existence of the 'threat o peace, 
a breach of the peace or an act of aggression' that is 
a precondition for invoking Articles 41 (the 'sanction 
article') and 42 (the 'enforcement article') of the UN 
Charter. Actually, premandatory Security Council 
resolutions contain phrases that mimic the Article 39 
requirements. Such resolutions are to be interpreted 
as diplomatic hints that the Security Council is on the 
brink of implementing sanctions. On the one hand, 
this offers the target a face saving way out and may 
thus be helpful in achieving the sender's goal. On the 
other hand, this may act as an important incentive for 
the target o build stockpiles and adjust its economic 
structure in advance. 
The neoclassical model 
Consider Figure 3 which illustrates the neoclassical 
model of a complete mbargo which is implemented 
at moment to .8 Figure 3 shows four consumption 
points: x r, the free trade consumption point, x r, the 
free trade production point which becomes the 
consumption point at to if the economy did not 
anticipate the sanction, xa, the autarky consumption 
point which will ultimately be reached if the sanction 
blocks all international exchange and, finally, XA,F, the 
free trade consumption point if the economy does not 
specialize at all (for example, when an autarkic 
economy is just opening up to international trade or 
if a trading economy expects very severe sanctions in 
the near future). 9 Movements between xr and x A are 
8 It is not necessary to assume complete blocking of trade. The same 
results hold if the effect of the sanctions is like a tariff or a partial 
embargo imposed by the sanctioning country (or group of countries) 
on the target's exports. 
Note that the economy's trade pattern in XA.V reflects its compara- 
tive advantage, but that the economy's production structure does 
not reflect this comparative advantage. See also Van Marrewijk 
and Van Bergeijk [35]. 
costly and take time since the factors of production 
need to be reallocated. Sanction damage decreases over 
time and consists of a transitory part D = U(XA)--U(Xr) 
and a permanent loss P = U(Xv)- U(XA), the well-known 
gains from trade. This permanent loss can analytically 
be subdivided into a part E = U(XA. r ) -  U(XA), the gains 
from exchange, that relates to the fact that the sanction 
prohibits all international exchange and a part 
S=U(XF)--U(XA.r) that represents the gains from 
specialization i production due to international trade. 
Note that a limit exists to the extent of anticipation 
as it will in general not be advantageous for the target 
to change its production structure to the right of the 
autarky production point.l° 
Expected utility 
Our theory combines the insights of the two approaches 
to the relationship between the time variable and the 
probability of success of economic sanctions. 11 We 
study the target's options and alternative conomic 
trajectories in a model that analyses an economic 
decision unit (the target) which is confronted by (the 
threat of) an economic sanction, possibly in a super 
game setting of which we only model the target's deci- 
sion process. We assume that the target country is 
risk neutral, which enables us to normalize such that 
u(y) = y.12 We distinguish between three different yields 
that influence the target's behaviour (Yn > YN > YL > 0): 
(i) yN=yield of neutral activities which the sender 
does not oppose. 
(ii) Yn=the sanction threat is false: the target does 
not comply and no sanction is imposed. 
(iii) YL = the sanction threat is real: the target does not 
comply and the sanction is imposed. 
We assume that the target derives some benefit from 
the 'misconduct' hat induced the sanction threat, so 
that the premium of non-compliance (Yr--YN) is 
positive. 
Figure 4 translates Figure 3 into a time path for 
~o However. if the probability that one becomes the target of a sanc- 
tion depends on the volume of trade, then it may pay this economy 
to specialize against comparative advantage (Van Marrewijk and 
Van Bergeijk 1-35]). 
1 We do not go into the problems of actual implementation of
sanctions. See, however, Carter 1_12] for an overview of available 
sanction instruments, Smeets [45] for a general macroeconomic 
assessment and Van Bergeijk [1,2] for an empirical investigation 
into the determinants of success and failure of economic sanctions. 
~2 Given some sanction threat, risk averse targets are more likely 
to cooperate whereas risk loving targets are more likely not to 
comply (Van Bergeijk [2], pp 45-70). Risk non-neutrality, however, 
would unnecessarily complicate the exposition of our topic of the 
dynamic Bayesian learning behaviour in the context of economic 
sanctions. 
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Figure 4. The impact of an economic sanction: time path of 
utility. 
national welfare for the case of a complete mbargo. 13 
In the limit, as t~,  utility will settle at the autarky 
level U(XA). The immediate ffect of an embargo at time 
t o is a fall from the free trade, full specialization welfare 
level Yn to YL, the no trade, full specialization welfare 
level. So the total sanction damage that can be 
imposed in any given period consists of a permanent 
part and a transitory part so that YL-- YF- D-  E. Once 
the sanction is issued, both Yn and YL are influenced 
by the target's adjustment while it moves the factors 
of production and we assume that t periods after the 
issuing of the sanction the transitory part of the 
sanction damage and the gains from exchange have 
reduced to 6'D and 6tE, respectively. Naturally, we 
have 0 < 6 < 1; and the smaller 6, the larger the speed 
of adjustment. 
Finally, we have the target's ubjective probability 
rc that the sanction will actually be imposed in the 
next period by the sender, given that the target does 
not comply.14 This probability determines the target's 
expected utility of non-compliance. Consider Figure 4 
t3 Note that we do not define the exact unit in which t is measured. 
This unit may be interpreted as years, months, weeks or days with 
only the logical implication that the other variables uch as the 
yields and the discount rates are also defined for the same time unit. 
t4 Note that this probability cannot be expected to be established 
on the basis of a physical probability distribution as Hufbauer et 
al [26] only describe 116 economic sanctions in their Economic 
Sanctions Reconsidered which is the standard reference on this 
subject. See Bull [10] and Bonetti [6] for a critical evaluation of 
the Hufbauer and Schott study. Moreover, the number of cases in 
which economic sanctions were expected or contemplated is un- 
known (see Tsebelis ([49], pp 26-271. 
where at t o + t the target weighs a and b with (1 -~)  
and ~, respectively. The target country does not know 
this probability 7r with which the sanction is imposed. 
So it will have to make an educated guess about the 
parameter g, which can be represented by an a priori 
distribution function of ~z. Indeed, this is a case par 
excellence where good judgement and subjective 
weights of evidence and learning are essential features 
of rational decision making.15 
Two crucial hypotheses are the unitary actor 
assumption and our treatment of the yields and 
discount rates as exogenous parameters in time. 
Indeed, there is more to economic sanctions than the 
processes that are studied in our model. Often 
government actions are the result of group decisions, 
but laboratory tests by Haney et al [24] of the 
differences between unitary actors and advisory 
models shows that 'the unitary actor model is on the 
right track. Such a model does not do great harm to 
model the larger questions' (Haney et al [24], p 632). 
Likewise the valuation of the yields may fluctuate quite 
substantially (depending, for example, on who runs 
the target country), and the rate of time preference for 
a despotic ruler might swing to the current period 
when faced by sanctions that might cost him his job. 
Indeed, even costs that can be objectively determined 
using standard economic techniques may be valued 
very differently by different rulers. Our model does 
not address these issues, but at the cost of reduced 
transparency these issues could be incorporated. 
Exogenous a priori  probabilities 
Since we study the response of a target country to 
sanctions over time, we have to discount he (expected) 
future outcomes (or yields) that are the possible result 
of present decisions. The present discounted value of 
complying PDV(C) consists of the discounted future 
stream of normal pay offs YN, which at the rate of time 
preference p yields (0 < p < 1): 
YN PDV(c)= ~ PJYu-  (!) 
j=0 (1 -p )  
Given the subjective a priori probability 7t that a 
sanction will be imposed, the net expected value of 
not complying in period 0 is 
(1 -- ~)(yr + S) + 7r(yv -- E-- D) (2) 
We describe the development of damage over time in 
accordance with the traditional neoclassical trade 
tSSee Good [20] and Epstein and Le Breton [16] on subjective 
probability and Bayesian learning. 
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model illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. Calculating the 
expected present discounted value of not complying 
PDV(NC)  requires that we take both the sanction 
damage and the speed of adjustment into account. 
After t periods of adjustment, he gains from special- 
ization have reduced to 6'S and the transitory damage 
to 6'D. The discounted expected yield at t o of not 
complying is therefore: 
p'[(1 - n)(yr + 6'S) + 7z(yv - E--  6'D)] (3) 
So provided nD~>(I-rt)S (otherwise there is no 
expected gain in adjusting the economy), we may 
write: 16 
YF -- rtE r tD-  ( 1 - rr)S 
PDV(NC)= - -  (4) 
1 -p  1 -p6  
The target will decide to comply if the present 
discounted value of compliance is larger than or equal 
to the present discounted value of non-compliance: 
PD V(C) >1 PDV(NC).  Let for notational convenience 
q=-( I -p ) / (1 -p6)E( l -p ,  1) be the appropriate dis- 
count rate for adjustable items (D and S) in order to 
rewrite the condition for compliance as 
rt(qD + E) >~( y r -  yu) + (1 - rc)qS (5) 
So the expected temporary damage and the forgone 
gains of exchange must be larger than or equal to the 
sum of the premium of non-compliance (Yr-YN) and 
the expected gains from international specialization. 
So the premium of non-compliance has to be balanced 
against he expected isutility of the sanction, taking 
adjustment into account. This requires that sanction 
damage is weighted by the subjective probability that 
a sanction will be actually implemented in the next 
period and that the transitory components are cor- 
rected for the speed of adjustment and the rate of time 
preference, respectively, as these terms are changing 
over time. The condition of Equation (5) which 
describes the case of exogenous subjective probabilities 
is more likely to hold (and therefore the target is more 
likely to comply) if, other things equal, the premium 
of non-compliance decreases (either by a decrease of 
Yr or an increase of YN), the rate of time preference 
increases (p decreases), the speed of adjustment 
decreases (6 increases), or sanction damage (D, E, 
and/or S) increases. 
Although instructive, the model in this section is 
unable to explain why economic sanctions take some 
16 Note that the economy will never adjust if a sanction is imple- 
mented as long as rtD<(l --rt)S and will only comply if rt(P-D) 
>~(yr--yN)+(l -- rt)S. 
time to work. Allowing for learning, the next sections 
will show that some sanctions work a priori while 
others will not work at all. 
Learning: endogenous ex post  probabilities 
If the sanction instantaneously ucceeds, time does not 
have a role to play, because the target complies and 
hence the sanction episode nds. In the two other cases 
(sanctions that continue forever and sanctions that 
take some time to work) both learning and adjustment 
are important: the target will update its belief that the 
sanction will be implemented in the next period while 
it also adjusts the allocation of the factors of pro- 
duction.IV Learning influences the a priori probability 
that the sanction will be implemented if behaviour 
does not conform to the standards et by the sender 
country or group of countries. 
All that we conjecture at this point is that the target 
makes an educated guess about he parameter ~, which 
can be represented by an a priori distribution function 
of ft. We propose a learning rule that is a simple 
example of adaptive learning, in which agents use an 
intuitive procedure. In our model the target's pro- 
cedure for making and changing its choices on the 
basis of past outcome is the statistical rule of Bayesian 
updating. 18 Epstein and Le Breton [16] show axio- 
matically that the existence of a Bayesian prior is 
implied if preferences are based on beliefs and admit 
dynamically consistent updating in response to new 
information. In this sense our learning rule is 'simple 
but adequate'. Let rto be the Bayesian (subjective) a 
priori probability that a sanction will be imposed. This 
a priori probability is based on information such as 
the success rate of sanctions in general or the sender's 
track record with respect o sanction implementation. 
Let ~,, t >/1, be the Bayesian update of this probability 
if a sanction has been imposed for t periods with 
7t0 ~< nl ~< n2 ~< --. ~< nt ~< rt,+ 1 ~< --- and strict inequality 
if actual learning takes place and that lim,. ~n, = 1. 
An important difference between learning and 
adjustment is that the learning process tarts immedi- 
ately, whereas adjustment only happens if the per- 
ceived benefits of adjustment exceed the perceived 
costs of adjustment (ie the reallocation of the factors 
of production). So we will distinguish two situations: 
immediate adjustment and postponed adjustment. 
171n addition to the question that we investigate in this paper, 
learning could be applied to the other parameters of the model as 
.perceived by decision makers, and to their preferences. 
18See, for example, Honkapohja [25] or Evans and Hokapohja 
[17]. One important feature of this rule in contradistinction to
Guesnerie and Woodford [22] is that the weight attached to the 
forcast errors decreases to zero. 
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Immediate adjustment (noD >1 (1 - no)S) 
When the target adjusts its economic structure 
immediately if it is hit by a sanction, we find ex ante 
compliance if: 
no(qD + E) >1 (YF -- YN) + (1 -- no)qS (6) 
If the condition of Equation (6) does not hold the 
target does not comply and we assume that a sanction 
will be imposed (if the sanction is not imposed, the 
target for obvious reasons will never comply). In 
period 1 the target again has to decide whether or not 
to comply. Two things have changed since period 0: 
(i) First, the target received information that the 
sanction was not false and so it updates its belief 
about the probability that the sanction will be 
imposed in the next period. Learning has taken 
place (so no~nx). 
(ii) Second, the target has partly adjusted its economy 
to reduce the economic impact of the imposed 
sanction, ie the transitory components have re- 
duced to 6D and 6S in period 1. 
So, as time passes by, the target evaluates both the 
sanction history of inflicted (but insufficient) damage 
and the prospects of adjustment leading to reduced 
(but more probable) damage. The target will comply 
after period one if: 
n l (q fD+E)>l (y r -yu)+(1  - n l )q~S (7) 
If, however, the condition of Equation (7) does not 
hold, then the sanction continues and so will the 
learning and adjustment processes. The target will 
comply after period t if: 
nt(qftD + E) >~ (YF -- YN) + ( 1 -- nr)q6tS (8) 
Note that as t~oo, the condition of Equation (8) 
reduces to E>>-(Yr--YN). Hence as long as the gains 
from international exchange xceed the premium of 
non-compliance, the target can ultimately be forced 
to comply. This may account for the long duration of 
sanctions when clearly visible results do not materialize. 
The Western strategic embargo against the Eastern 
bloc might be an example as this sanction is generally 
thought to have been ultimately quite successful 
(Roodbeen [39]). 
It is more likely that the target will comply if 
PDV(NC)  falls from period t to period t+ 1, ie if: 
Total learning effect /> total adjustment effect 
A,E + tl~f*lA, D >1 q~'[1-6j[n,D-[l-n,]S] + q,~'* tA, S 191 
direct cross- direct cross- 
learning cost adjustment gain 
effect effect effect effect 
with A,~-rt,+i-n,~>0 
The direct learning effect, the cross-cost effect and the 
cross-gain effect involve A t (which goes to zero as 
t~oo) and fall rapidly over time. This means that the 
direct adjustment effect tends to dominate the other 
effects after a while, so that compliance becomes less 
likely. 19 From a policy perspective this suggests that 
unsuccessful sanctions that are continued for a long 
period of time are most probably unnecessarily costly. 
Postponed adjustment (noD < (1 - no)S) 
If the condition of Equation (6) holds then we have 
ex ante compliance and hence there is no adjustment. 
In the other case sanctions will be imposed. The target 
starts to learn, but it will not adjust its economy at 
time t unless 
ntD t> (1 - nt)S (10) 
Now as t~oo it follows that nt~l  so that Equation 
(10) in the long run requires D~>0. Hence for positive 
adjustable damage the target will ultimately always 
adjust its economic structure ither until all possi- 
bilities are exhausted or until compliance follows. 
Let T be the first period in which the target perceives 
adjustment to be beneficial, ie nrD>~(1-nr)S.  Then 
the target will comply if: 
nt(D + E) >>. YF -  YN + (1 - n,)S 
for t<T  (no adjustment) 
nt[q6 r -  tD + E] >~ YF -- YN + (1 -- nt)q6 r -  'S 
for t>~T (adjustment) 
(!1) 
Numerical example 
So far our model has distinguished between the 
following five possibilities: 
(i) ex ante compliance; 
(ii) sanctions, economic adjustment only after period 
T until the target complies; 
(iii) sanctions, economic adjustment only after period 
T, no compliance; 
(iv) sanctions, no economic adjustment until the 
target complies (T = 0); 
(v) sanctions, economic adjustment until the target 
complies (T = 0). 
These results hold for general Bayesian rules for 
updating. Our example uses the so-called beta distri- 
~9 For example for A t the beta distribution is 
/~+l 1 
At=(~+fl+ 3+t)(ot+[~+ 2 +t) ~ t- 7 
which approaches zero much more quickly than fit. 
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Table 1. Numer ica l  example? ~ 
Base case 
t* fl t* p t* ~ t* )'t- t* YN t* E t* D t* S t* 
P 3 A 0.6 1 0.6 7 2.7 A 1.4 ~ 0.9 ~ P 0.1 A 
4 8 4 A 0.7 2 0.7 7 2.8 A 1.6 91 1.1 63 P 0.3 2 
5 6 5 2 0.8 3 0.75 6 2.9 2 1.8 21 1.3 16 1.2 6 0.8 4 
6 5 6 5 0.9 5 0.8 5 3.0 5 2.0 5 1.5 5 1.5 5 1.0 5 
7 3 7 8 0.95 6 0.85 3 3.2 21 2.1 2 1.6 3 1.8 3 1.1 5 
8 I 8 10 0.97 7 0.9 2 3.4 91 2.2 A 1.7 1 2.2 1 1.3 6 
9 A 9 13 0.99 7 0.95 1 3.6 ~ 2.3 A 1.9 A 2.4 A P 
(A -  ex ante ( instantaneous) compliance, P = postponed adjustment; ~'- -ad jus tment  exceeds learning; sanction will never work). 
bution function as a tool to explicitly model a specific 
Bayesian expectations formation process. Conse- 
quently, the numerical example is a special case of the 
general model that was analysed in the previous 
sections. This beta function is characterized by the 
parameters ~ and /3 and is a versatile distribution 
function that has the great analytic advantage that 
Bayesian updating again leads to a beta posterior 
probability density function. The probability density 
function for ~> - 1 and/3> - 1 is (Fisz [18]): 
g(Tr)- (:~ +/3)" g~(l -~) '  (12) 
:d/3! 
The expected value and variance are: 
~+1 
E(~)-  - -  (13) 
:~+/3+2 
(~+ 1)(/3+ 1) 
Var(Tr) (14) 
(~ +/3+ 3)(~ +/3+ 2) 2 
The target country will have some a priori ideas about 
the probability E(g) that a sanction will be executed 
upon (continued) non-compliance and about its 
variance Var(Tt) which represents its confidence about 
the estimate E(rt). This is sufficient o determine the a 
priori parameters ~and/3. For example, if the target 
thinks all n's are equally likely ('extreme ignorance') 
then ~ =/3 = 0 and g(rt)= 1. Alternatively, if the target 
thinks r~ > ½ to be less likely, then it implicitly assumes 
~</3.2o Suppose then, that the target decides not to 
comply and that a sanction is imposed. If the target 
is a Bayesian learner, the updated values for ~ and/3, 
~* and/3" say, after a sample of size n with r 'events" 
are :~*=~+r and ~3*=~3+n-r, espectively. Now if 
the target does not comply and a sanction is imposed 
the sample size is one (n = 1 ) and the number of'events' 
2. Since the target country is risk neutral, we may use E(rO in the 
a priori sense to determine whether or not the country will cooperate 
in period O. 
is also one (r = I ), which implies ~* = :~ + 1,/3* =,8 and 
(~+2) 
E(~ln = r = I )= -~1 (15) 
(~+fl+3) 
In general: 
(:~+ 1 + t) 
E(~ln = r = t) = = ~, (16) 
(~+/3+2+t)  
We illustrate the model by presenting a numerical 
example in Table 1. Let t* be the first non-negative 
integer t so that Equation (11) holds. 21 The following 
four possibilities are illustrated in Table 1: 
(i) Ex ante threat: t *=0;  the target complies 
immediately. 
(ii) Immediate adjustment; learning effect dominates 
adjustment effect (T = 0): 0 < t* < ~;  the sanction 
has to be imposed for t* periods during which the 
target is learning about the seriousness of the 
sender. The target economy adjusts to avoid part 
of the sanction costs, but adjustment is limited in 
scope and speed. After t* periods the target 
complies. 
(iii) Immediate adjustment; adjustment effects domi- 
nates learning effect (T=0): t *=~;  even if the 
sanction is imposed forever, which is very costly 
for both the sender and the target, the target will 
never comply. This requires E<(yr--YN). 
(iv) Postponed adjustment (T>0): large values of/3 
and S or small values of :~ and D imply that 
(rc0D<(1-too)S), in which case adjustment is no 
longer immediate. Three situations can be dis- 
tinguished. (1) Postponed adjustment before com- 
pliance. For the base case this occurs, for example, 
if ceteris paribus S = 2. Then the target starts to 
adjust in period 3 and complies in period 6. 
(2) Postponed compliance without adjustment. 
For the base case this occurs, for example, ifceteris 
-' ~ Note that Equat ion (11 )covers all cases because T = 0 is possible. 
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paribus S = 4. Then the target complies in period 
I I (before it starts to adjust the economy which 
would have taken place in period 12). (3) Postponed 
adjustment without compliance. For the base case 
this requires a change in, on the one hand, the 
adjustable sanction damage and its probability 
and, on the other hand, the yields E, Yv or YN- 
We define our base case as a hypothetical sanction 
for which :t =6 and f l=6 (implying E(~o) = 0.5 ), E= 1.5, 
D= 1.5, S= I, yv=3,  yN=2, p=0.9  and 6=0.8. In this 
case it takes t *= 5 periods before the target complies. 
Next we investigate how a change in the explanatory 
variables ceteris paribus changes the value of t*. If, for 
example, ~ increases we find that for ct = 9 (~ increases 
to 0.59) the sanction threat will ex ante enforce 
compliance and so the sanction does not have to be 
implemented. 22 In contrast, when the gains from 
exchange decrease to E = 0.9 we find that the sanction 
will never work. 
Extensive simulations as illustrated in Table 1 
suggest that a sanction will take longer to succeed 
when ~t decreases or fl increases (E0z) decreases), when 
sanction damage decreases (either E, S or D decreases), 
when the yield of misconduct increases (either Yr 
increases or Ys decreases) and when the rate of time 
preference decreases (p increases) or the speed of 
economic adjustment increases (6 decreases). 
Anticipation, learning and adjustment 
Now suppose that the target anticipates the imposition 
of economic sanctions after T periods, for example 
because a sanction threat has been expressed and the 
target knows the time period that in general passes 
between the decision that sanctions will be implemented 
and the moment of their actual legal implementation. 
Figure 5 illustrates what anticipation implies in terms 
of the trajectories that were introduced in Figure 4. 
We can discern several trajectories in Figure 5. A 
rather uninteresting trajectory is the horizontal ine 
through point e that represents the truly autarkic 
economy. Such an economy cannot be hit by economic 
sanctions. 23 The trajectory of the trading economy 
that does not anticipate a sanction can be represented 
u(X F ) 
S 
U(XA, F ) 
E 
u(X A ) 
u(X T ) 
a b c 
d ' 
. . . . . . . . . . .  1 . . . . . . . .  td 
e i .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
" "  - - ' ' ' '  J 
## S oss  ~" 
f ,  / ,," 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  _ . . . . . .  
f 
t o - t t o 
F igure  5. Ant ic ipat ion  o f  an economic  sanct ion:  t ime path  
o f  ut i l i ty .  
by acfi, assuming that the economy starts to adjust at 
time to or by acfgj, when it takes some time before 
economic adjustment to the sanction can start. If the 
sanction is anticipated by the target hen a trajectory 
abdf'h becomes possible and the target has to balance 
the costs of anticipation (the area bcd') against the 
benefit of a reduction of the sanction damage after 
time t o (namely the area befreenf'h andfi). Note the 
limit to anticipation as there is no incentive to reduce 
consumption below XA. r (point d in Figure 5). Note 
that since actually no sanction is imposed before to = r, 
learning does not take place and g is fixed up till the 
moment of implementation. 
We have two situations. The first situation is when 
gD<(1-Tz)S so that adjustment is not deemed 
beneficial. This essentially boils down to the situation 
that was analysed above. The second situation deals 
with ~D>~(1 -r0S.  Even if the target a priori decides 
that it will comply, we have a period in which the 
target persists in its objectionable, but presumably 
profitable, behaviour. If it maximizes utility it will only 
comply once the sanctions are actually implemented: 
22 Note that any n o can be obtained with many combinations of
and ft. Lower 2"s and fl's imply by Equation (14) large variance and 
hence more uncertainty. So in our model the learning effect is 
stronger and sanctions will take longer the less reliable the target 
considers the information on which it builds its a priori beliefs about ~. 
23This does not exclude the possibility that the economy may 
become the target of an economic sanction. This assumption merely 
states that the autarkic economy will not change its behaviour if a 
sanction is imposed. Such sanctions are a curiosity. Tony Lowenberg 
once pointed out that Canada withdrew South Africa's landing 
rights although there were no direct flights from South Africa to 
Canada. 
PDV(C)= {j~oP~(Y~: + S)I + {j:~+ l P~Yu} 
(1 - p~+ 1)(yv + S)+ p ~+ ty u 
1 -p  
(17) 
The target always starts adjustment at r (as this is 
profitable since ~zD >~(1 -n)S),  but it may start antici- 
patory adjustment T* periods earlier. The delay in 
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implementation f the sanction gives the target a first 
mover advantage. Naturally, z* ~<r. The present dis- 
counted value of non-compliance at z* now becomes: 
t --'C* 
PDV(NCIz*)= ~ pJ(yv + S) 
j=O 
+ ~ pJ(yF6J-~+~*S) 
j=r - r *+ l  
+ ~ p J [y r -nE-6  j-r+~* 
j=r+l  
x [riD - (1 - n)S]] (18) 
The first term states that the target does nothing until 
it anticipates that adjustment becomes beneficial. The 
period of anticipatory adjustment starts z* periods 
before the actual implementation of the sanctions, as 
indicated by the second term. Finally, the third term 
describes adjustment while the sanctions are actually 
in force. The target's problem in anticipating the 
sanctions is to choose a value of r* that maximizes 
PDV(NCIr*), ie 
PDV(NC)=max(PDHNCIT*)[z*6{O, 1 . . . . .  z}} (19) 
Rewrite Equation (18) as: 
PDV(NCIz*) = hl(y v, S, E, p, r, rr) 
p'r+ I 
+ 
(I -p6) 
h2(z* , D, S, p, 6, rt) 
with 
yr+S-p  ~+lrcE 
hx(*)- (20) 
1 -p  
h2(e) = p - r*{6S[l - (p6) ~*] - S/q} 
--6~*+ 1[riD--(1 -rOS] 
Combining Equations (19) and (20), it follows that 
maximization of PDV(NCIr*) is equivalent to maxim- 
ization of h2(e) and independent of Yr, YN, E and r 
(provided the constraint r*~<z is not binding). The 
gains from exchange E can always be reaped as long 
as the sanctions are not yet imposed so that these 
gains do not influence the target's decision concerning 
the moment when it starts its adjustment process. 
Likewise the yield of misconduct does not influence 
the questions of why and when to adjust (it does of 
course influence the decision whether or not to 
comply). Once the sanction is actually imposed, the 
analysis proceeds along the lines discussed above. 
Table 2. Numerical example of the optimal period of anticipatory 
adjustment. 
Base case 
S r* p r* ~ r* n r* D r* 
2.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.4 0 0.5 0 
1.5 1 0.8 1 0.7 1 0.5 1 1 1 
1.0 2 0.9 2 0.8 2 0.7 2 2 2 
0.5 3 0.95 2 0.9 3 0.8 2 3 3 
0.4 4 0.97 2 0.95 4 0.9 3 5 4 
0.3 5 0.99 3 0.97 5 0.95 3 7 5 
Table 2 illustrates our model numerically. We define 
a base case for S= 1, p =0.9, 6=0.8, n=0.7 and D=2. 
Our model implies that adjustment is optimal if the 
adjustment process tarts two periods before the actual 
implementation of sanctions. So if the actual imple- 
mentation is anticipated to be in period 10, the target 
will not adjust its economy before period 8. If, however, 
at t=0 the sanctions are anticipated to be imple- 
mented in period 1, adjustment is immediate. Next we 
investigate how changes in the exogenous variables 
influence the optimal adjustment period. For example, 
if the gains from specialization increase beyond 2.5 
adjustment is immediate, while it is postponed until 
period 5 if S is set equal to 0.3. The simulations 
reported in Table 2 show that anticipation is ceteris 
paribus more relevant he slower the speed of adjust- 
ment (1-6) ,  the higher the rate of time preference 
(1 -p) ,  the larger the a priori probability n, the larger 
the transitory damage D and the smaller the gains 
from specialization S.Taking anticipation i to account 
therefore does not alter our results in a substantial 
way. Obviously, the adjustment effect is more likely 
to exceed the learning effect so that compliance 
becomes less likely if sanctions are announced some 
periods before they are implemented. Sanctions will 
not achieve compliance more quickly if they are 
announced earlier. If the time frame is such that the 
target gets more time than it needs to adjust in an 
optimal way, no effect will be discernible until the 
optimal process of adjustment starts. 
Summary and conclusions 
The generalized history of economic sanctions as an 
instrument of foreign policy shows that most sanctions 
take some years to become a success, although in fact 
some instances of ex ante compliance and quite a 
number of long-lived unsuccessful sanctions exist. 
Traditional economic analysis of sanctions can only 
discern sanctions that work a priori or that will not 
work at all. A second feature of the sanction 
instrument is the uncertainty about its actual imple- 
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mentation in the (near) future. Hence we argue that 
theory should take into account the stochastic out- 
come of situations in which sanctions are threatened 
or applied. This implies that targets, on the one hand, 
may need some time to arrive at 'better' (more realistic) 
estimates of the probability that sanction damage will 
be delivered in the near future if behaviour persists in 
misconduct, ie does not conform to the standards et 
by the sanction sender. On the other hand, a target 
may anticipate the imposition of a sanction so as to 
reduce the costs of non-compliance. 
We model the decision by the sanction target to 
comply or to persist as a function of both economic 
adjustment and Bayesian learning. Our model dis- 
tinguishes between sanctions that (i) work directly (ex 
ante compliance), (ii) take some time to work and (iii) 
will never work. 24 Moreover we distinguish between 
economic adjustment and political compliance. We 
show that sanctions that do not achieve ex ante 
compliance may still work in the future provided that 
permanent (unadjustable) sanction damage exceeds 
the yield of misconduct. Delivering permanent damage 
increases the probability that the target will comply 
as the target learns to better understand the sender's 
determinedness. Taking anticipation into account 
does not alter our results in a substantial way. 
Obviously, the adjustment effect is more likely to 
exceed the learning effect so that compliance becomes 
less likely if sanctions are announced some periods 
before they are implemented. Sanctions will not 
achieve compliance more quickly if they are announced 
earlier. If the time frame is such that the target gets 
more time than it needs to adjust in an optimal way, 
no effect will be discernible until the optimal process of 
adjustment starts. 
An implication of our model is that the actual 
development of observable variables (such as changes 
of the economic structure) does not give much 
information about whether or not the target will 
actually comply. This result may be of interest to 
analysts of specific sanctions that are in force. 
Sanctions which do not work instantaneously (iethere 
is neither economic adjustment nor political com- 
pliance) can work in the long run, but only if learning 
dominates adjustment. Imposing sanctions for too 
long may only bring about unnecessary costs for both 
the sender and the target without increasing the 
probability of compliance. In general ong-lived sanc- 
tions can only have some positive utility if(i) the target 
is very stubborn, dull or disbelieving and (ii) perma- 
24 Bonetti [7] recently arr ived at s imilar results on the durat ion of 
economic sanct ions in a model which studies economic sanctions 
as an iterated discrete-time war of attr i t ion and uses sunk cost 
account ing to explain the persistence of sanction episodes. 
nent sanction damage is sufficiently large. Otherwise, 
sanctions hould only be implemented for a limited 
number of years. 
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